# Latania Akers-White, M.D.; Decision and Order
On March 18, 2025, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Latania Akers-White, M.D., of Richmond, Virginia (Registrant). Request for Final Agency Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX), at 1, 4. The OSC proposed the revocation of Registrant's Certificate of Registration, No. FA2343630, alleging that Registrant's registration should be revoked because Registrant is “currently without authority to prescribe, administer, dispense, or otherwise handle controlled substances in the Commonwealth of Virginia, the state in which [she is] registered with DEA.” *Id.* at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)). [^1]
[^1] According to the OSC and Agency records, Registrant's registration expired on June 30, 2025. *Id.* at 1. The fact that a registrant allows her registration to expire during the pendency of an administrative enforcement proceeding does not impact the Agency's jurisdiction or prerogative under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to adjudicate the OSC to finality. *Jeffrey D. Olsen, M.D.,* 84 FR 68474, 68476-79 (2019).
The OSC notified Registrant of her right to file a written request for hearing, and that if she failed to file such a request, she would be deemed to have waived her right to a hearing and be in default. *Id.* (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not request a hearing, and the Agency finds her to be in default. RFAA, at 3. [^2] “A default, unless excused, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the registrant's/applicant's right to a hearing and an admission of the factual allegations of the [OSC].” 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
[^2] Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated May 8, 2025, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on Registrant was adequate. The included declaration from a DEA Diversion Investigator (DI) indicates that on March 24, 2025, the DI and other DEA employees attempted to personally serve Registrant a copy of the OSC at her last known address, but no one answered the door. RFAAX 2, at 1. The DI then called Registrant, informed her about the OSC, and verified her mailing address. *Id.* at 2. On March 25, 2025, the DI mailed a copy of the OSC to Registrant's registered address through USPS. *Id.; see also Id.* at 3. The DI was able to confirm through the USPS tracking number that the OSC was delivered to Registrant on March 27, 2025, as the last update states, “delivered, left with individual.” *Id.; see also Id.,* at Attachment A.
Further, “[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order pursuant to [21 CFR] 1316.67.” *Id.* at 1301.43(f)(1). Here, the Government has requested final agency action based on Registrant's default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c), (f), and 1301.46. RFAA, at 4; *see also* 21 CFR 1316.67.
**Findings of Fact**
The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the factual allegations in the OSC are deemed admitted. According to the OSC, on or about July 11, 2024, the Virginia Department of Health Professions suspended Registrant's Virginia medical license. RFAAX 1, at 2. According to Virginia online records, of which the Agency takes official notice, [^3] Registrant's Virginia medical license is currently “Suspended.” Virginia Department of Health Professions License Lookup, *https://dhp.virginiainteractive.org/Lookup/Index* (last visited date of signature of this Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds that Registrant is not licensed to practice medicine in Virginia, the state in which she is registered with DEA. [^4]
[^3] Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency “may take official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding—even in the final decision.” United States Department of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979).
[^4] Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), “[w]hen an agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to show the contrary.” The material fact here is that Registrant, as of the date of this Order, is not licensed to practice medicine in Virginia. Accordingly, Registrant may dispute the Agency's finding by filing a properly supported motion for reconsideration of findings of fact within fifteen calendar days of the date of this Order. Any such motion and response shall be filed and served by email to the other party and to the Office of the Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, at *[email protected].*
**Discussion**
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized to suspend or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 “upon a finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license or registration suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . . . dispensing of controlled substances.” With respect to a practitioner, DEA has also long held that the possession of authority to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner's registration. *Gonzales* v. *Oregon,* 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (“The Attorney General can register a physician to dispense controlled substances `if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.' . . . The very definition of a `practitioner' eligible to prescribe includes physicians `licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he practices' to dispense controlled substances. § 802(21).”). The Agency has applied these principles consistently. *See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D.,* 76 FR 71371, 71372 (2011), *pet. for rev. denied,* 481 F. App'x 826 (4th Cir. 2012); *Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D.,* 43 FR 27616, 27617 (1978). [^5]
[^5] This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). First, Congress defined the term “practitioner” to mean “a physician . . . or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . , to distribute, dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of professional practice.” 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration, Congress directed that “[t]he Attorney General shall register practitioners . . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.” 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a practitioner under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation of a practitioner's registration is the appropriate sanction whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which he practices. *See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D.,* 76 FR at 71371-72; *Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D.,* 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); *Dominick A. Ricci, M.D.,* 58 FR 51104, 51105 (1993); *Bobby Watts, M.D.,* 53 FR 11919, 11920 (1988); *Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D.,* 43 FR at 27617.
According to Virginia statute, “dispense” means “to deliver a drug to an ultimate user or research subject by or pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner, including the prescribing and administering, packaging, labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the substance for that delivery.” Va. Code § 54.1-3401 (2025). Additionally, Virginia statute defines “practitioner” as “a physician . . . or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, prescribe and administer, or conduct research with respect to a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in [Virginia].” *Id.*
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant lacks authority to practice medicine in Virginia. As discussed above, a physician must be a licensed practitioner to dispense a controlled substance in Virginia. Thus, because Registrant lacks authority to practice medicine in Virginia and, therefore, is not authorized to handle controlled substances in Virginia, Registrant is not eligible to maintain a DEA registration. Accordingly, the Agency will order that Registrant's DEA registration be revoked.
**Order**
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No. FA2343630 issued to Latania Akers-White, M.D. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby deny any pending applications of Latania Akers-White, M.D., to renew or modify this registration, as well as any other pending application of Latania Akers-White, M.D., for additional registration in Virginia. This Order is effective January 5, 2026.
**Signing Authority**
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on November 24, 2025, by Administrator Terrance C. Cole. That document with the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as an official document of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the *Federal Register* .
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.